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Abstract  
Following Daniel Ortega’s victory in the presidential election held in November 
2006, Nicaragua has been undergoing a transition from a democratic to authoritarian 
system. In the 1980s, Ortega served as President of the Sandinista government and 
implemented a Cuban-type socialist system, but the system failed and democracy 
was established during 1990-2007. Considering this failure, why did Ortega succeed 
in taking power again? This paper provides a brief history of modern Nicaragua and 
gives some insights into the twists of Latin American politics. The paper was 
prepared for the international seminar on Helping Failed States Recover: The Role of 
Business in Promoting Stability and Development, organized by the University of 
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THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION AND POST-CONFLICT 
DEVELOPMENT—KEY ISSUES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 During the past three decades Nicaragua has experienced a large transformation, from an 
authoritarian government to civil war, to state socialism to democracy, reconciliation and a market-
oriented economy. The post-conflict process was painstaking and tough. Some issues remain unsolved. 
As far as the economy is concerned, free-market economy functioned well. Real GDP in terms of 
1994 Córdoba prices increased by 62% between 1994 and 2006 and real per capita GDP at 1994 
dollar price (6.72 Córdoba per US$1.00) recovered by 18.6% from US$693 to US$822 during the 
same period.  Social indicators such as illiteracy rate, extreme poverty and school attendance also 
showed improvements.  
 
 In the 2006 election, Daniel Ortega, who was President in 1985-1990, was reelected, with 
about 35% of the vote, to the Presidency. This is a dramatic and surprising result which has caused 
considerable uneasiness in many people in Nicaragua and raised the expectations of Sandinista 
supporters. In Latin America, the left has gained momentum because of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela 
and Evo Morales in Bolivia. In which direction will Nicaragua go? 
  
 The first section in this paper includes a brief description of the Sandinista revolution. The 
second section deals with the democracy process, especially, three issues, hyperinflation, 
demobilization of the army, and property issues.  The third section explains the economic recovery, 
and the fourth describes some obstacles for investors. The fifth section analyzes the 2006 election and 
the Sandinista’s return to power. In the sixth section, some lessons will be discussed, in particular, the 
notion that the gap between the rich and the poor has expanded under more free-market oriented 
policies is negated by the recent household survey.   
 
 
1. THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION 1979–1990 
 
  In 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN in Spanish) defeated the Somoza 
dictatorship and established its own government. The FSLN or Sandinista government introduced a 
state socialist, Cuban-style regime in Nicaragua. In the Somoza era “Less than 1 percent of the land 
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owners owned over 40 percent of all farmland. The Somoza family alone held approximately 20 
percent of the total” (Field and Fisher III 2001, 212). Massive expropriation of agricultural land and 
nationalization of firms was imposed throughout the country. The Sandinista government seized 
private land including that owned by the Somozas and their allies and distributed it to landless 
peasants or cooperatives. In the 1979-1981 period, Sandinista government confiscated over two 
thousand properties (2.4 million acres of land) and 120 firms to state control (Ibid., 213). The agrarian 
reform extended over the country and the number of properties and area affected by the reform 
reached 1,518 properties with 1,558,702 acres from 1981 to 1988 (Luciak 1995, Table 4.1). As a result, 
State farms occupied 11.7% and Sandinista cooperatives 20.1% of all agricultural land (Jonakin 1997, 
Table 2). 
 
Many business people, farmers and professionals, many of whom lost much of their wealth as 
a result of the Sandinista Revolution, fled the country to Costa Rica or the U.S. during the Sandinista 
Revolution; and as economic conditions deteriorated and internal strife intensified many poorer 
Nicaraguans also fled the country. 
 
 Although the Sandinista government did introduce a few successful policies such as greater 
access to education for illiterate people and an expansion of inexpensive or free medical services, 
their seizure of private property including factories as well as agricultural land, their huge expansion 
of government, state regulation of the economy and government spending, and the resultant hyper 
inflation and economic depression, generated widespread resistance against the Sandinista Revolution. 
The contras, backed by the U.S. government, fought against the Sandinista army and the country was 
beset by civil war. At the same time, the Soviet Union, the then East European socialist countries, and 
Cuba and Libya helped the Sandinista government with armaments, training and economic aid. A 
typical example was the construction of a 3000m-runway  airport (Magazine 2006, 12-18) so as to 
bring Mig 21 jet-fighters to Nicaragua (it was never fully materialized and the airport was abandoned). 
Thus, it was, in a sense, a proxy war between the socialist and free/democratic countries but this 
should not obscure the fact that there was a civil war.   
 
 Extremely high government deficit spending, including war expenditure and economic 
mismanagement, exacerbated by U.S. economic sanctions from 1981 and a trade embargo in 1985, 
brought the Nicaraguan economy to its knees. Expenditures of the central government as percentage 
of GDP reached the record level of 58.6% in 1984 and the government deficit (excluding foreign 
donations) as against GDP recorded the highest point at -25.5% in 1988. Monetary base increased by 
186% in 1985, 235% in 1986 and 610% in 1987 (see TABLE 1).  All these led Nicaragua to hyper 
inflation and economic collapse. The civil war caused huge sacrifices to the country, too. Thirty 
thousand eight hundred sixty-five Nicaraguans died and twice that many were injured. Destruction of 
property and harm done to the economy was similarly astonishing. “The material damage and damage 
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to productive forces resulting from the war totaled US$1,998 million; the financial blockade meant for 
Nicaragua a loss of US$642 million, and the commercial embargo another US$459 million; the added 
costs for defense and security (in excess of the average 1980-1982 defense expenditure) in the period 
1983-1989 totalled US$1,933 million, for a total of US$5,032 million. The aggregate effect of these 
on the gross national product was US$4,055 million, for a grand total of US$9,087 million.” (cited by 
Close 1999, 28 from Oquist 1992). 
  
During the 1979-1990 Sandinista Government, real GDP at 1980 Córdoba fell every year 
except 1980-81 and 1983 (see FIGURE 1). Real per capita GDP (estimated at 1980 U.S. dollar), 
therefore, suffered a severe decline, US$703 to US$474 during 1979-90. In the Somoza period, 
ironically, the same per capita GDP increased from US$668 to US$1,104 during 1960-77. Hyper 
inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, reaching a staggering 14,316% in 1988 (see 
FIGURE 2). 
  
 A widespread desire for peace and economic stability after years of civil conflict and 
economic depression resulted in peace talks mediated by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, leading 
to the Esquipulas Accord in 1987. Then President Daniel Ortega (1985-90) agreed to presidential and 
congressional elections. The elections were held on February 25, 1990 and Doña Violeta Barrios de 
Chamorro, of the National Opposition Union (UNO) was elected President. Before handing over the 
government to President-elect Chamorro, many of the leading members of the Sandinista government 
divided some nationalized companies, and extensive agricultural lands, and seized urban mansions 
and government properties among themselves, what was called ‘la piñata’. 
 
 
2. INTRODUCTION OF DEMOCRACY 1990–2007 
 
The 1990-2007 period covers three presidents: Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (1990-1997), 
Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo (1997-2002), and Enrique Bolaños Geyer (2002-2007). During this sixteen 
year period a series of important reforms were undertaken.  
 
• Democratic elections were instituted for selecting the president, vice president, deputies, 
mayors, members of city councils and representatives of autonomous territories (North 
Atlantic Autonomous Regions or RAAN in Spanish abbreviation and South Atlantic 
Autonomous Regions or RAAS). 
• Four independent powers of government were consolidated: the Executive, Legislative, 
Judicial system and Supreme Election Council. 
• Government intervention in the economy was substantially reduced giving greater scope for 
the market in allocating resources by (i) lifting price controls; (ii) liberalizing of trade and 
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capital flows (through lower trade taxes and controls on capital movements); (iii) 
privatization of nationalized and other state companies; and (iv) downsizing the huge 
government through spending and tax reductions and bringing spending roughly in line with 
income and external aid. 
 
Three Big Issues. The post-conflict reconstruction and development of Nicaragua constituted 
a daunting task given the magnitude of the economic disaster the new government inherited.  Many 
major challenges had to be faced, including the conquest of hyper inflation, the disarmament of 
combatants and reduction of the size of the armed forces, and the establishment of ownership of 
properties confiscated by the Sandinista Government. 
   
 Regarding hyper inflation, in May 1990 the Chamorro government introduced a new currency 
called “Córdoba Oro” (or Gold Cordoba) which was equivalent to US$1.00 in order to replace the old 
monetary unit, (the Córdoba Nuevo). In March 1991, the government devalued its Gold Cordoba  to 
C$5.00 per US$1.00, and called the new unit “Córdoba”. But the fundamental policies that enabled 
the government to root out hyper inflation were bringing fiscal expenditure in line with tax revenues 
and external aid. As a result of much sounder fiscal and monetary policies, supported by abundant 
foreign assistance, inflation was slashed from 7,485% in 1990, to 24% in 1992, and subsequently was 
cut to less than 10% in 1994 (see also FIGURE 2). 1 
 
 The Chamorro government wisely decided to keep Humberto Ortega, brother of then 
outgoing Sandinista President Daniel Ortega, as Defense Minister. He was the key person in 
demobilizing more than 80,000 government soldiers, leaving a force of less than 15,000, and in 
disposing of the excess weaponry (Walker 2003, 61). The contra soldiers—those who fought against 
the Sandinistas, also demobilized (22,500 fighters). This success raised another problem: how to 
enable the demobilized government and contra soldiers to undertake new livelihoods. This was 
another formidable task given the devastation of the economy, but as economic activity began to 
recover these former soldiers were progressively reabsorbed into the labor force.  
 
 As regards property issues, this has been the most difficult obstacle for development.  The 
thousands of people whose properties were confiscated during the Sandinista regime have been 
pressing for the return of these properties, and have filed huge numbers of claims in the courts. 
Confusion over property rights arose in part from ambiguity in land holdings because the Sandinista 
government did not issue title documents to the beneficiaries of the massive land confiscations. 
Almost half of the beneficiaries got only preliminary titles or no documents at all. Moreover, during 
the waning days of the Sandinista government, the Sanidistas seized many properties, both urban and 
rural, in what is known as the ‘piñata’ and these seizures were later protected by a series of laws (85, 
86 and 88)  (Lacayo 2006, 298). By the time the Chamorro government took power, up to 40% of the 
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land in Nicaragua was of disputed ownership with both current possessors and former owners 
claiming title to the same property (Field and Fisher III 2001, 211). Several measures were taken such 
as issuing government bonds to compensate the confiscated persons in 1992. To settle this issue, 
principally, two laws were promulgated, one in 1996 “Property Stability Law (209),” the other in 1997 
“Law of Urban and Rural Reformed Property (278).” 
  
 The land tenure structure drastically changed according to the agrarian reform by the 
Sandinista Government and the reform by the Chamorro government. Naturally, the portion of the 
large-scale estates shrunk to 21.0% while the Sandinista Agrarian Reform (SAR) sector gained by 
31.8% in 1988.  On the other hand, after the Chamorro’s reform, the SAR sector almost disappeared 
while small- and medium-scale farms enormously increased to 71.0% in 1993 (see TABLE 2). It is 
said that SAR-related farmers were still obtaining around 20% of agricultural land in the 1990s.  
 
 In 2005, a grave struggle took place between the government and the National Assembly. The 
legislative body wanted to intervene in the government by taking over some of the executive power 
such as a nomination of chiefs of national entities (such as the Nicaraguan Institute of 
Telecommunications and Post Office and the Nicaraguan Institute of Energy). The National Assembly 
also modified the property law which included the establishment of the Institute of Urban and Rural 
Reformed Property (Instituto de la Propiedad Reformada Urbana y Rural, INPUR). The Sandinista 
congressional deputies wanted to nominate their people to the Property Institute. The dispute was 
finally mediated by the OAS--the Organization of American States--and such laws and intentions of 
the Sandinista deputies were postponed till January 2007 by the Framework Law in October 2005. 
(This was again prolonged one more year in January 2007.) 
  
After assiduous efforts and complex negotiations for many years, the problem of land 
ownership has not been fully resolved. For example, U.S. citizens or Nicaraguans who have U.S. 
citizenship are still fighting in the Nicaraguan courts to settle their property claims, and these 
unresolved cases number more than 800.  
 
 
3. ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
 
Solid Recovery.  Three Presidents (Chamorro, Alemán and Bolaños) undertook so-called 
neo-liberal, free market-oriented economic policies and established democracy. They welcomed 
foreign direct investment, promoted privatization and liberalized capital markets. They also actively 
sought foreign aid. The Nicaraguan economy recovered in 1994, backing to a positive GDP growth at 
more than 3% and its positive trend continued till 2006. Particularly, 1995 (5.9%), 1996 (6.3%), 1999 
(7.0%), 2004 (5.1%) were excellent years for Nicaragua although 2002 (0.8%) was a year of slow 
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growth due to a financial turmoil. Per capita real GDP measured at 1994 dollar increased by 15% 
from US$712 in 1995 to US$822 in 2006. Since 1999 inflation has remained below 10%. (see  
FIGURE 3 and TABLE 3).  
  
Between 1995 and 2006 both exports and imports tripled, with exports reaching US$1.3 
billion and imports, US$3 billion. Revenue of the central government gradually increased but its 
expenditure always exceeded revenue. As a result, fiscal deficits prevailed every year. The deficits 
were financed by abundant foreign aid, especially after the Hurricane Mitch devastated the country in 
1998. Most of the country’s external debt was cancelled in 2004 (approximately US$4.5 billion) when 
Nicaragua was recognized as having reached the completion point of one of the HIPCs (Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries). 
  
 The National Commission for Nicaraguan Free Trade Zones (CNZF) was created in 1991 and 
the first FDI from Taiwan came to a free trade zone in 1992. Such industrial zones helped promote 
FDI, mainly in light industries such as textiles and apparel, reaching US$241 million in 2005. By 
2005, the number of free trade zone industrial parks had increased to 25, and were located throughout 
Nicaragua. Active user enterprises reached 91 directly employing 75 thousand persons with added 
value (net exports) of US$210 million (see TABLE 4). Top three investment countries are: South 
Korea (24 firms); USA (23 firms); and Taiwan (17 firms). 
 
In addition, during the Bolaños administration, the Central American countries and the 
Dominican Republic negotiated a free trade agreement with the U.S. In the case of Nicaragua, the law 
was ratified and the agreement (DR-CAFTA) has been in effect since April 2006. Nicaragua’s exports 
jumped 22% in 2006, compared to 14% growth in 2005.  
 
Role of the Private Sector. The Nicaraguan private sector played a vital role in the 
country’s economic renewal. Nicaraguan businessmen who had fled to Costa Rica and the U.S. during 
the Sandinista Regime in the 1980s came back to their homeland and started new businesses during 
the 1990s. Foreign investments also flowed in the country as the government implemented free-
market economic policies backed by the World Bank and IMF. Advanced countries also supported 
Nicaragua by means of large amount of economic cooperation. 
  
 As explained above, many firms invested in the free trade zones. Textile and apparel 
industries had a largest share followed by tobacco and electronic parts industries. For example, one 
Mexican wire harness company employs about 3,500 persons. 
 
 The American Chamber of Commerce in Nicaragua now has 168 members include many 
well-known multinational corporations as well as Nicaraguan domestic companies.  These foreign 
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enterprises include ESSO, Shell, Texaco, Siemens, Bayer, Nestle, British American Tobacco, CEMEX 
(Mexican cement Co.), Telefónica, Walmart, XEROX, DHL, UPS, American Airlines, Continental 
Airlines, Delta Airlines, Maersk Logistics, Hertz, and Pizza Hut. Domestic enterprises include 
banking and insurance (BANCENTRO, BDF, BANPRO, Seguros América, etc.), Petronic 
(distribution of oil derivatives), Casa Pellas (auto sales), Nicaragua Sugar Estates (sugar and rum 
production), Agri-Corp (trade of agricultural products, etc.), Casa Terán (sales of electronic products), 
TIP TOP (fried chicken), Eskimo (milk products), Seminole S.A.(hotels), and CANAL 2 (TV). 
 
 During the past sixteen years, the living standards of the Nicaraguan people have increased 
enormously.  Per capita real GDP has approximately doubled during this period due to liberalization 
and free market economic policies together with abundant foreign assistance. In the last four years a 
construction boom has been taking place in Managua and sea resort areas. However, some critiques 
also point to negative factors. One big issue is income distribution. Although the poor strata are 
decreasing, the gap between the rich and the poor is said by critics to be expanding. I’ll return to this 
issue below. 
  
 Another issue is energy. Electricity generation in Nicaragua heavily depends on thermal 
generation at 75%, while hydroelectric generation at 10%. (In neighboring Costa Rica, 80% of 
electricity is provided by hydroelectric generation as against 10% by thermal generation). Part of 
power generation was privatized. Distribution is done by only one private Spanish company (Unión 
Fenosa). The recent run-up in petroleum prices has caused difficulties for all electricity companies, 
resulting in frequent and long blackouts in Nicaragua. This also caused repeated suspensions in water 
supply because water is pumped up from ponds and wells by electricity. These problems also should 
be solved. 
 
 
4. NEGATIVE FACTORS FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
 
During 1990-2006, private investment, which had collapsed while the Sandinistas were in 
power, expanded greatly but not as rapidly as was expected or hoped. Several negative factors help 
explain this situation. 
 
Political Uncertainty.  No party held a majority in the National Assembly (92 seats) except 
for the 1990 election. In the 1990 election UNO got 51 seats while the Sandinistas got 39.  In the 1996 
election PLC (Liberal Constitutionalist Party) got 42 seats while the Sandinistas obtained 36.  In the 
2001 election, the liberals got 53 seats (later PLC became 42) whilst FSLN secured 38. The liberal 
executive administration had to negotiate with the Sandinista to pass necessary regulations and laws.  
Sometimes the legislative body opposed against the government to form a coalition or ‘pacto’ between 
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PLC and FSLN, especially, in the Bolaños government (2002-2007) since Bolaños arrested former 
President Alemán for corruption charges. Bolaños himself had to be occasionally allied with FSLN to 
rescue his government. This political instability with a weak government functioned negatively for 
foreign investors’ decisions. 
 
Politicized Powers. Both the PLC and FSLN struggled to have positions in the Supreme 
Court, the Supreme Electoral Council, the Audit Board, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. For 
example, in 2006, the Supreme Court was composed of 8 PLC-related persons and 8 Sandinistas, 
while the Supreme Electoral Council was divided between 3 PLC-oriented judges as against 4 
Sandinista judges. This made Nicaragua lose independent and transparent judgments. In particular, 
distorted judgments in court made investors blink their eyes in surprise.2 
 
Poor Infrastructure. If a country does not have good highways, ports, airports, and 
telecommunications, foreign investment lags.  If electricity blackouts and water supply cuts take place 
everyday, investment also is adversely affected. Only 12% of roads are paved in Nicaragua. In much 
of the country road transport is precarious during the rainy season.3 Some runways in regional airports 
are not paved. It is urgent to improve the quality of infrastructure in Nicaragua. 
 
Corruption and Favoritism. Both corruption and favoritism are common, especially, 
among politicians, high-ranking government officials, police officers and even judges. President 
Alemán (1997-2002) himself was later arrested on corruption charges and sentenced to a 20-year 
prison term. (In fact, he was placed under house arrest but was allowed to freely move about in the 
Department of Managua. In March 2007, he was authorized to freely move about in Nicaragua.) 
Institutional weakness and longstanding bad custom should be changed.  In sum, transparency, 
fairness, justice and accountability are lacking and these factors constitute major obstacles to business 
expansion, economic growth and poverty reduction. 
 
 
5. ORTEGA’S NEW GOVERNMENT 
 
Ortega’s Return. As a result of the 2006 elections, Daniel Ortega once again became 
president of Nicaragua, in January 2007, bringing back the Sandinistas to the pinnacle of power after 
a 16 year hiatus following their 1979-90 government. History repeats itself. This victory can be 
attributed to the following factors. 
 
First, the Liberals were split between two candidates--José Rizo (PLC candidate) and the 
Eduardo Montealegre (Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance, ALN candidate). As a result, although Daniel 
Ortega received only 38% of the vote, the majority of the vote was divided between the two liberal 
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candidates (Montealegre 28.3% and Rizo 27.1%). If the liberals had been unified behind one 
candidate, Ortega would not have been elected since between them the two liberal candidates for 
president garnered more than 55% of the vote. It was a strategic failure. 
 
Second, another factor that greatly aided Ortega’s return to power is the ‘pacto’ or alliance 
between former President Alemán and Ortega. Together, these two politicians and their respective 
parties (PLC and FSLN) changed the Constitution in 2000 in such a way so as to make the election of 
a minority vote candidate far easier.  In effect, the percentage of the vote required to win in the first 
round of presidential elections was lowered from 45% to 35% (provided that the candidate receiving 
the highest percentage of the vote has a 5 percentage point advantage over the second leading vote 
getter; otherwise the minimum vote required to triumph in the first round was lowered to 40%).  
Hence, despite the fact that 62% of Nicaraguans voted against Ortega, he was elected with 38% under 
the reformed constitution (as his vote exceeded that of the second place candidate by about 10 
percentage points). 
 
Third, the Sandinistas were strong at the local level. In the 2004 local elections the 
Sandinistas elected 86 city mayors of the 153 mayors elected nationwide. The Sandinista local 
election machines functioned well for while new comers such as Montealegre were unable to organize 
effectively at the local level. 
 
Fourth, young voters (above 16 years old) did not know what the Sandinistas had done 
during the 1980s. These young voters favored Ortega, who ran a well-organized directed in part at 
capturing the youth vote. (For instance, his campaign used a popular Beatles song as its anthem.) 
   
Fifth, Ortega argued that globalization and so-called neo-liberal policies did not work well 
and that poverty remains widespread in Nicaragua. In particular, he argued that the gap between the 
rich and the poor widened.  These arguments resonated with a large enough minority of the population 
to help Ortega regain election even though his assertions are not supported by the facts in Nicaragua, 
as will be discussed below.  
 
Sixth, Sandinistas were also divided by the emergence of Herty Lewites, former Managua 
Mayor and a mild Sandinista belonging to MRS (Sandinista Renovation Movement) for presidential 
candidate. Unfortunately, he died of heart attack in July, 2006 during the election campaign. Edmundo 
Jarquín substituted Lewites but he was not strong enough to divide the Sandinista votes.  
 
With respect to the National Assembly, the Sandinistas won 38 of the 92 seats, while most of 
the rest were divided among the two liberal parties. (The PLC won 25, the ALN 22 and the MRS won 
5 seats.  Two seats were filled by ex-President, Bolaños and the second-place candidate in the latest 
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election, Montealegre).  
 
Policies of the New Ortega Government.  Presumably, the policies of this Sandinista 
government will differ from those of the Sandinista Government of the 1980s because those policies 
failed miserably and because the world has changed in the past quarter century.  While much remains 
to be defined, the new Ortega government has announced a series of policy directions and priorities: 
• Emphasizing poverty reduction measures (such as the ‘Zero Hunger Plan’, special credits 
for small farmers, fishermen and entrepreneurs and a large campaign against illiteracy).  
• The need for urgent solutions (such as imports of petroleum from Venezuela at 
preferential conditions) for energy and water sectors in order to stop blackouts and cut off 
of drinking water interruptions. 
• Maintaining US-Nicaragua relations while developing very close ties with Venezuela, 
Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Iran. 
• Maintaining DR-CAFTA (the new free trade agreement with the U.S.) while exploring 
entry into Hugo Chávez’ alternative economic integration scheme ALBA (Alternativa 
Bolivariana para Las Americas or Bolivar Alternative for the Americas). 
• Welcoming foreign direct investment. 
• Respecting private property. 
• Formation of the Communication and Citizenship Council to govern from the bottom 
(“people are President”). 
 
The development of close relations with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez represents a 
major change with respect to the previous several governments. President Chávez attended Ortega’s 
inauguration ceremony in January 2007 with Evo Morales of Bolivia and Rafael Correa of Ecuador. 
President Chávez swiftly acted to aid Nicaragua, preparing a package of cooperation which included: 
(i) donation of 32 thermal generating plants; (ii) exporting 10 million barrels of petroleum per year to 
Nicaragua at preferential conditions; (iii) construction of an oil refinery (production capacity of 
150,000 barrel per day); (iv) construction of a gas pipe line; (v) construction of an aluminum factory;  
(vi) credits for small farmers using Venezuelan BANDES (Economic and Social Development Bank) 
branch networks which will be newly opened in Nicaragua; (vii) building houses for low-income 
people; (viii) forgiveness of Nicaraguan debt to Venezuelan (US$32 million).  
 
Nicaragua will continue to rely on generous foreign assistance for some time so that heavy 
dependency on Venezuelan aid is one of its choices. However, whether this external aid will fully 
materialize or is sustainable remains to be seen.  How such dependence on Venezuela assistance 
affects Nicaragua’s access to other sources of external assistance and foreign investment also remains 
to be seen. 
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Given Ortega’s continuing strident critique of market-oriented policies, and his closeness to 
Hugo Chávez and the Cuban leadership, many Nicaraguans are greatly concerned about the future 
direction of the country, including in the area of economic policies and performance, as well as the 
security of their property and investments.  After only three months in office, it is still too early to tell 
in what direction he plans to take the country. For now, people in Nicaragua are taking a wait and see 
attitude.  
 
 
6. NICARAGUA’S PARADOX: STRONG POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY BUT 
SANDINISTAS RETURNED TO POWER 
 
President Ortega and the Sandinistas argue that so-called neo-liberal or market-oriented 
economic policies and globalization favor the wealthy at the expense of the poor, increasing poverty 
and the gap between rich and poor within and among countries. Such assertions are common on the 
political left in Latin America.4   Nicaraguan statistics, however, show that during 1993-2005, when 
the socialist economic regime was gradually dismantled and market- and more private sector-oriented 
policies and institutions introduced, just the opposite occurred in Nicaragua. According to nationwide 
household surveys undertaken by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC), the 
proportion of the Nicaraguan population living in poverty declined from 50.3% in 1993 to 45.8% in 
2001, and was 46.2% in 2005. Moreover, the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty 5 
decreased from 19.4% in 1993 to 14.9% in 2005 (see FIGURE 4).  
 
 Furthermore, contrary to the Sandinista critique, inequality also declined during this period, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, where a higher Gini indicates greater inequality and a lower Gini 
indicates less inequality in the distribution of income. In 1993, the Gini Coefficient was 0.49, and 
thereafter decreased progressively, to 0.44 in 1998, 0.43 in 2001 and 0.40 in 2005, showing 
improvements (see TABLE 5). In addition, these data imply that Nicaragua has one of the least 
unequal distributions of income in Latin America (see De Ferranti, et. al., 2004, Table 1).   
 
 INEC also found that the illiteracy rate in Nicaragua decreased from 25.8% in 1995 to 22.0% 
in 2005 based on data from the 2005 Population Census and Household Survey (see TABLE 6).  The 
illiteracy rates of males and females were virtually equal in 2005. In addition, the school attendance 
rate between the age of 6 and 29 increased from 34.3% in 1971, to 48.0% in 1995 , and to 51.7% in 
2005 (see TABLE 7). 
 
These positive trends in poverty reduction, less income inequality and improved social 
indicators through market-oriented, business-led growth in the post-conflict period also have been 
facilitated by remittances from Nicaraguans living abroad and foreign aid. An estimated 800,000 
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Nicaraguans live in the U.S. and more than 100,000 reside in Costa Rica, compared to a total 
population of 5.1 million in 2005. Their remittances to Nicaragua are estimated at about US$800 
million per annum, substantially increasing the country’s income and the purchasing power of 
families across Nicaragua, including both higher and lower income groups. In addition, many of these 
Nicaraguans have invested in the expansion of business activities in the country.  
  
 Official Development Assistance by advanced countries and international financial 
institutions (IFIs) also has helped spur the recovery of economic activity and improvement of social 
indicators in post-conflict Nicaragua. UN organizations such as UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP (World 
Food Program) are actively assisting health, food, nutrition, and education in remote, very low-
income regions. Of course, advanced countries also are helping Nicaragua through such organizations 
as USAID, CIDA (Canada), DANIDA (Denmark), COSUDE (Switzerland), and JICA (Japan).  IFIs 
such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank also are active in supporting 
programs in education, health and infrastructure aimed at reducing poverty.  Foreign aid to Nicaragua 
averaged more than US$450 million per year during the period 1997-2005, having reached US$601 
million in 2004 (see FIGURE 5). 
 
Nicaragua’s fundamental challenge continues to be to sustain rapid economic growth so as to 
enable employment generation and a steady reduction in poverty. In order to increase employment and 
income, higher levels of local as well as foreign investment are needed. Investment requires sound 
infrastructure and impartial institutions as discussed above. These are mainly government tasks with 
good governance. Nicaragua has a huge potential for development. Nicaragua needs more investment 
for producing higher value added goods. In this respect, East Asian experiences will help this tropical 
country (Kagami 2006). 
  
 Social development policies such as education, health, and a social safety net focused on the 
lower-income groups also are important. However, growth is more important (Embajada del Japón 
2006). If economic growth is not sufficiently rapid and sustained, employment and income will not 
progressively increase. The more important notion in the growth process is that growth creates 
working spirits and spontaneous efforts to work. If the government provides subsidies in many sectors, 
as happened during the 1980s, this discourages work and it also causes enormous fiscal deficits, 
resulting in, in the Nicaraguan case, in hyper inflation, and in the end, economic collapse and violent 
conflict. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 Looking at the big picture, the successive post-conflict governments generally made the right 
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policy choices to promote economic recovery and reduce poverty in Nicaragua. The free market 
economy prevailed. The private sector grew through privatization and deregulation. The establishment 
of free trade zones and DR-CAFTA (the free trade agreement with the U.S.) contributed to increase 
trade and investment in the country. Income disparity declined considerably. The proportion of the 
population living in both poverty and extreme poverty also substantially decreased.  
 
 What is wrong in this country is conflicts in politics. Caudillo style politics continue to play a 
huge role. Although the Sandinistas are strong, the liberals are also formidable if they get together. 
ALN and PLC could achieve the majority in the National Assembly if they can unite or at least 
cooperate. It is a pity that the democratic parties did not cooperate in the recent election. 
 
 Social developments consideration can not be ignored; however, growth aspects are more 
important than social development if the country is at the initial stage of development.6 Growth can be 
only generated by investment (see FIGURE 6). If there is no investment, there is no employment or 
income. Good infrastructure and impartial institutions are necessary to enable investment. And 
without secure property rights, people are naturally very reluctant to invest and the absence of secure 
property rights has been a major barrier to higher investment and growth in the country.  If one has 
resources from income, one can afford to share other expenditures such as social welfare costs.7  
 
One more important factor is the strategic vision. It is quite common in East Asia that the 
state of chief has a clear and strong vision on his or her country’s future path. For example, 
industrialization is a universal target in China and India. To achieve industrialization, they both 
emphasized foreign investment and outward-oriented trade policies. They also put emphasis on high 
value-added products, such as electronics industries in China and software industries in India. 
Tropical East Asian countries such as Thailand and Vietnam, which are situated in the same latitude 
zone as Nicaragua, are following the same development path of industrialization and export-led 
growth. 
  
Why not Nicaragua? 
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NOTES 
*  This paper was written when I served as Ambassador for Nicaragua (2003-2007). The views 
expressed here do not represent those of the organization to which I belonged.  
  
1      The exchange rate policies were addressed at a pre-announced crawling rate in accordance with 
the advice of the IMF: depreciation of 12% against the U.S. dollar per annum during 1995-98, 10% in 
1999, and 6% since 2000 to the present. 
2    The Judicial Career Law was passed in the National Assembly in 2004 for judges to be more 
professional and independent. However its execution is slow. 
3      Nicaragua has only two seasons: rainy season (from mid-May to mid-November) and dry season 
(from mid-November to mid-May). 
4     In East Asia high economic growth brought about relatively well-balanced income distribution 
due to the government intervention in social and welfare development policies. 
5     Extreme poverty is defined as minimum daily consumption of food per person at 2,187 calories 
on average. This requires annual food consumption expenditures of about US$221 per person per year. 
Those who have less than this income are classified as extremely poor. The overall poverty line is 
defined as the extreme poverty line plus other consumption such as housing, closing, transport, and 
education. Meeting these needs requires consumption expenditures of about US$414 per capita per 
year. Those who have less than this income per year are classified as being below the overall poverty 
line and are classified as poor. 
6     President Chávez’s rhetoric is that the poor is always ignored and the gap between the poor and 
the rich expands so that Latin America needs, what he says, socialism or Bolivarian Revolution, 
seeking a more egalitarian society. President George Bush’s recent trip to Latin America emphasized 
social justice and needs of U.S. aids to these fields, saying “Nearly one out of four people in Latin 
America lives on less than two dollars a day. Many children never finish grade school. Many mothers 
never see a doctor” (Speech at the 17th Annual Legislative Conference of the U.S. Hispanic Chamber 
of Commerce, March 5, 2007).  
7      President Enrique Bolaños always said “Si no hay maiz, no hay tortilla, no hay pinol, ni pinolillo, 
ni rosquillas, ni yoltamal, ni nacatamal, ni güirilas, ni cientos de comidas y bebidas que gustan y 
demandan los nicaragüenses (If there is no corn, neither there is tortilla, nor pinol, nor pinolillo, nor 
rosquillas, nor yoltamal, nor nacatamal, nor güirilas, nor thousands of food and beverages which 
Nicaraguans are fond of and ask).” 
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